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(Better Public Services Advisory Group 
[BPSAG], 2011, pp.5, 3). The ministers 
responsible said the advisory group’s report 
‘provides an appropriate platform for an 
on-going programme of state services 
performance improvement’ (Offices of the 
Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of State Services, 2012). Two 
other decisions – to lower the cap on the 
number of public servants and to create a 
new business-facing ministry by merging 
four existing government agencies – were 
also announced as part of what has been 
collectively called the government’s ‘Better 
Public Services’ reform programme. The 
deputy prime minister and minister of 
state services have jointly signalled their 
intention to amend the Public Finance 
and State Sector acts to ‘give public sector 
leaders more flexibility to operate in 
different ways’ to achieve better results, 
and to retain the advisory group to ‘ensure 
the next phases of the reform programme 
produce real and demonstrable change 
on the ground – and within the desired 
timeframes’ (Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of State Services, 2012).
New Zealand is not alone in its goal to 
change the paradigm of its public services: 
In March 2012 the prime minister announced a set of ten 
goals or result challenges, and named the ministers who are 
to be held politically responsible for achievement of each of 
the the results and the specific public sector chief executives 
with management accountability. This ‘to-do list’ (Key, 2012) 
was accompanied by the release of the report from a group 
of four senior public officials and three private sector people 
known as the Better Public Services Advisory Group, which 
had provided advice to government in late 2011 on how the 
public sector should be reconfigured to improve the ‘system’s  
efficiency and effectiveness – in short to do more and better 
with less’. The report says that it is the ‘starting point for an 
ongoing programme of reform over the next five years. The 
objective is better services for New Zealanders, of a type and 
at a scale that enables our society and economy to flourish’ 
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the United States, England, Scotland, 
Singapore and Australia, to name a few, 
have similar aspirations. The prime 
minister positioned the Better Public 
Services reform as one of four priorities 
for the government, alongside financial 
management, economic growth and 
rebuilding Christchurch. If the level of 
international activity aimed at improving 
public services and the priority and 
importance given to Better Public Services 
in New Zealand are indicators, then the 
implementation of New Zealand’s Better 
Public Services programme demands 
attention at home and will be of interest 
further afield. While it is early days, it is 
likely that the outcome of Better Public 
Services reform will be different from 
what people have so far named, planned 
for or even considered. Why this is 
likely to be so and why this matters for 
achieving the outcomes intended by the 
reform is the subject of this article. New 
Zealand could again be an exemplary case 
of public sector reform which generates 
international interest, not just for the 
boldness of its changes but also for its 
effectiveness in achieving better public 
services. The outcome of the Better Public 
Services programme will depend on a 
large number of contingencies – currently 
unknowns and unknowables – and the 
implementation approach needs to make 
allowance for this. This article draws upon 
the complex implementation literature 
to examine what is being implemented 
in the Better Public Service reform 
programme, what makes this a complex 
implementation, and the implications 
for those leading and participating in the 
reform programme.
What is being implemented?
Surveying the information about Better 
Public Services in the public domain at 
the time of writing reveals some of the 
complexity of what is being implemented. 
The January Cabinet paper outlining 
the reform programme contains an 
‘indicative change implementation 
roadmap 2012–2014’ with seven strands 
of work, one of which is the focus on 
‘results’. Achievement of the government’s 
ten result areas alone is a significant, 
challenging and complex implementation 
task. It is a complex implementation 
because the precise nature of the changes 
required to achieve the results is not 
currently known. They could not be 
known, even with an exhaustive amount 
of analysis, simply because government 
does not have all the information it needs 
to do such an analysis, and also because 
achieving the result requires the actions 
of many actors whom government and 
its agencies cannot directly control or 
predictably influence. According to the 
prime minister, achieving these results 
requires a change in the culture of the 
public sector. We agree on that point, but 
leadership of the results-focused complex 
implementation task envisioned by the 
prime minister is only one part of the 
implementation road map. 
The announcement that the State 
Services Commissioner will ‘lead the 
overall reform programme, supported by 
an Implementation Advisory Group’, the 
membership of which contains most of the 
non-public service members of original 
Better Public Services Advisory Group 
(Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
State Services, 2012), introduces another 
initiator of change alongside the ministers 
and chief executives named by the 
prime minister. This work is supported 
by the Department of Customs chief 
executive, who has been ‘asked by the 
State Services Commissioner to lead the 
implementation work programme’. The 
relationship between these arrangements 
and the chief executives charged with 
delivering the ‘results’ named by the 
prime minister is unclear, since the same 
Cabinet paper says, ‘other chief executives 
may [our emphasis] also attend meetings 
of the Advisory Group from time to 
time’ (Offices of the Prime Minister, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
State Services, 2012, p.2). Leadership of 
change appears to be split between the 
ministers and chief executives charged 
with delivering the nominated results, 
and the broader enabling processes led 
by the state services commissioner. An 
important question, therefore, is how 
to ensure that the implementation tasks 
led by the state services commissioner 
fit with and support achievement of the 
prime minister’s results-focused agenda. 
While the stated objective of the Better 
Public Services report is ‘a public service 
and state sector that is achieving value-
for-money, is innovative, provides high-
quality services and manages change 
effectively’ (BPSAG, 2011, p.3), it goes 
further than end points and principles/
touchstones and begins to specify 
instrumental means. 
The framework announced by the 
prime minister is primarily about goals, 
aspirations and directions of change in 
particular sectors and is silent about the 
means for getting the results. The advisory 
group report and its prescriptions for 
change are primarily about achieving the 
capability to achieve results systemically 
rather than achieving the results per se. 
This is a subtle but important difference. 
The advisory group report details what 
should happen to have the public sector 
perform more effectively as a whole to 
achieve results: clearer, stronger leadership, 
less clutter of decision points, and more 
motivation to continuously innovate and 
improve value for money from public 
expenditure. ‘The first significant change 
proposed … is to reconfigure the system 
much more directly around those results 
or outcomes that matter most to New 
Zealanders’. Now that government has 
clearly stated its priorities, state services 
should be a ‘proactive mobiliser of people 
and resources to deliver the priorities 
set by the government’ (p.6). Although 
these two sets of implementation tasks 
may appear superficially aligned and 
complementary, the social complexity of 
The advisory group  
report and its 
prescriptions for change 
are primarily about 
achieving the capability 
to achieve results 
systemically rather than 
achieving the results  
per se.
Implementing Better Public Services
Policy Quarterly – Volume 8, Issue 3 – August 2012 – Page 43
their implementation makes it doubtful 
that they will remain so. 
Under the arrangements that 
have been created it is likely that 
implementation will focus on the ‘easier’ 
structural and administrative changes, 
which are the domain of the technical 
experts leading the process, with only a 
marginal impact on the existing public 
service-centric culture, and in lieu of the 
harder but much-needed deeper systemic 
change towards a citizen-centric and 
results-orientated culture of improved 
performance. As strands of work identified 
on the implementation road map, these 
structural and instrumental changes are 
elevated in importance to the same level 
as the results, and, unfortunately, because 
they take the prime focus away from 
the achievement of the prime minister’s 
results, might in the end be the only 
‘results’ achieved. Without a primary 
focus on outcomes there are likely to be 
so many changes emerging from the work 
streams overseen by the state services 
commissioner that some much-wanted 
changes will be cancelled out by other 
changes, and opportunities for innovation 
will be lost. Unless, that is, there is a 
deliberate focus on learning and adapting 
plans at each step in the change process. If 
achievement of better services outcomes is 
the government’s priority, then there is a 
strong argument for leadership of change 
to come from the named ministers and 
chief executives expected to deliver the 
specific nominated results. They have 
their reputations on the line and the 
most to lose in the short term from any 
failure. Implementation of the advisory 
group’s report could then support and 
enable but not lead the change process. 
A deterministic focus on a centrally-
prescribed set of instrumental changes by 
the state services commissioner, and the 
closed intra-government process pursued 
to date, will limit the learning and un-
thought-about innovation and change 
that might be possible through pursuit of 
the better service results. 
What do we know about complex 
implementation?
If we temporarily leave aside the potential 
for conflict between the pursuit of results 
per se, and the implementation of a 
prescriptive set of instrumental changes 
expected to enable the achievement of 
the results, we can nevertheless be sure 
that both are complex implementations 
(Eppel, Turner and Wolf, 2011). That is, 
in spite of the beguiling simplicity of 
the way some of the goals and means are 
expressed, all need to engage the hearts 
and minds of multiple actors across 
government and its agencies, and, more 
importantly, people and organisations in 
the community as well. For example, the 
skills and employment goal of 85% of 18-
year-olds with NCEA level 2 equivalent 
or better needs a focus not only on the 
students and teaching and other practices 
in schools but also on a multitude of other 
factors, such as support from peers, family 
and whänau, which research says influence 
educational achievement. Failure to 
engage with all the actors who need to be 
part of the solution and have some of the 
knowledge required to find sustainable 
solutions is one of the reasons complex 
implementations fail (Klijn, Steijn and 
Edelenbos, 2010).
A complex implementation requires 
the active engagement of people and 
organisations which have some of the 
information and resources necessary 
to solve the problem (e.g. Kickert et 
al., 1997; Sanderson, 2009). There is no 
sign at this stage of these Better Public 
Services implementations going beyond 
the boundaries of core government 
agencies and engaging in a process of 
hypothesis testing and learning that 
will ultimately bring about both the 
culture change and the outcomes sought. 
The Better Public Services background 
documents portray thinking about the 
design and implementation of these 
reforms as merely complicated, not as 
complex, by failing to recognise all of 
the actors involved and how they will 
influence each other and the outcomes 
(Secretariat for State Sector Reform, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d; Evans, Guthrie 
and Quigley, 2012). To elaborate on the 
distinction: ‘complicated’ is about many 
bits to the puzzle and only some people 
having sufficient technical understanding 
to put the puzzle together in a way 
that works; it could be safe to assume 
that technical knowledge of public 
management structures, processes and 
accountability alone is sufficient, that 
there is only one best way for the puzzle 
to be solved, and that the bits of the 
puzzle are static and will act predictably. 
‘Complex’, on the other hand, while also 
allowing that there are multiple bits 
to the puzzle, acknowledges that these 
bits are also mercurial in their nature, 
defying attempts to pin them down 
because they are continually undergoing 
changes in response to each other and 
their environment. The knowledge and 
expertise needed to solve a complex 
puzzle is highly distributed and takes 
many forms, not just technical knowledge 
of structures, systems and processes of 
government. As a result of this dynamism, 
solutions require assumptions of 
unknowability and unpredictability, and 
that technical knowledge is not sufficient 
to understand these dynamics (Boonstra 
and de Caluwe, 2007; Butler and Allen, 
2008; Innes and Booher, 2010). Further, 
there is no one best solution, but rather 
a number of possible solutions that 
will come about through interaction 
and mutual accommodation between 
particular sets of actors, their local 
The Better Public 
Services background 
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context, and perceptions of the desired 
results and how progress towards those 
results might be achieved. This implies 
that better public services solutions could 
differ in different regions and sectors.
Developments in the scholarly 
literature on public management in 
recent decades have been moving towards 
an understanding of policy processes 
as complex non-linear interactions 
between actors, although the scholars 
differ in their explanations of the causal 
mechanisms at work: for example, 
the bounded rationality of actors (e.g. 
Lindblom, 1979; March and Olsen, 
1984); non-linear transfer from policy 
design to implementation because of the 
interdependent actions of ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ during the implementation 
process (Lipsky, 1980; Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1973); serendipitous 
combinations of problems and solutions 
(Kingdon, 1995); disproportionate 
information processing, leading to periods 
of stability interrupted by dramatic 
policy shifts (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005); formation of advocacy coalitions 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993); 
or horizontal inter-organisational 
relations between networks of actors 
(Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997). 
Complexity concepts have been used 
to elucidate aspects of policy processes, 
such as ‘complex adaptive system’ and 
‘coevolution’ in decision making (e.g. 
Gerrits, 2010; Rhodes, 2008; Rhodes and 
Murray, 2007); ‘adaptive systems’ and ‘self-
organisation’ applied to implementation 
(e.g. Butler and Allen, 2008); and self-
organisation and ‘emergence’ in the 
management of administrative networks 
(Meek, De Ladurantey and Newell, 2007). 
Teisman and colleagues have proposed 
a complexity-informed approach to 
understanding and managing complex 
governance processes (Teisman, van 
Buuren and Gerrits, 2009), while 
Sanderson (2009) proposed complexity 
theory and pragmatism as the pillars 
appropriate for designing and managing 
complex policy processes. These 
processes, Sanderson says, are best treated 
as experiments based on hypotheses, 
and they should be informed by active 
individual and organisational learning as 
implementation progresses.
An assumption of social complexity 
is needed in the implementation of 
Better Public Services because there 
are many independent decision makers 
(organisations and individuals) inside 
and outside government involved in 
the delivery of these services. Existing 
processes and relationships between these 
actors, such as accountability processes 
set up through the existing legislative 
and procedural processes of public 
administration and service delivery, create 
a set of dynamics that are difficult to 
observe, and nobody could possibly have 
full knowledge of the detail of all of these 
interactions. Therefore, implementation 
planning needs to be sufficiently flexible 
to enable learning to occur as part of 
the implementation process (Sanderson, 
2009). Furthermore, as changes are made 
under the Better Public Services reform 
programme, individuals and organisations 
will react according to perceptions of 
what is happening and might happen 
next. Complexity theory would view 
these individuals and organisations as 
parts of a complex adaptive system and 
their actions will affect the outcome. If 
those closely involved in the design and 
implementation of the Better Public 
Services reform treat it as complicated 
and needing the intense application of 
public management expertise, rather than 
complex and requiring learning from 
doing and input from diverse forms of 
expertise, and perspectives from public 
service users as well as public service 
designers, they risk missing out on the 
transformational end goals of the reform. 
The implications of social complexity 
discussed in this section are summarised 
in the first column of Table 1.
Many of the interactions between 
parts of the public sector system and 
parts of New Zealand society have 
achieved an apparent stability which 
belies the extent of non-linear, reflexive 
dynamism between the elements. A focus 
on particular solutions, which attempt 
to change one apparent macro-pattern 
of the public service for another without 
consideration of social complexity, risks 
blindness to important information 
which could call into question the basic 
underlying assumptions about those 
solutions, and can lead to disastrous 
outcomes (Gieve and Provost, 2012). 
The ongoing iterations of positive and 
negative feedback loops within the 
public service itself, and between public 
services and citizens, will produce self-
organisation and the emergence of new 
patterns of behaviour which were not 
thought of or known about at the outset. 
In the next section we outline how the 
implementation of the Better Public 
Services work programme might best 
be managed in terms of its leadership, 
ways of working and processes, taking 
into account the implications of social 
complexity so that the desired outcomes 
can be achieved. 
implications for managing the 
implementation of Better public Services
Complexity in the context of the 
implementation of Better Public Services 
means that the many individuals (public 
servants and private citizens who use public 
services) and organisations (government 
and community) involved in the delivery 
and use of public services need to be 
involved in designing how these services 
might be improved. Sorensen and Torfing 
(2011) name this type of collaboration as 
the unrecognised source of public sector 
innovation. At this stage there are many 
inside the public service, and most of the 
population beyond, for whom Better Public 
Services is unknown as a programme. 
Complexity in the context 
of the implementation of 
Better Public Services 
means that the many 
individuals ... involved in 
the delivery and use of 
public services need to 
be involved in designing 
how these services might 
be improved.
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Table 1
characteristics of the 
public management 
systems in which Better 
public Services will be 
implemented
implication for the implementation of Better 
public Services
Some steps towards complexity-friendly implementation of Better 
public Services
Interactions between 
individual and 
organisation actors 
make up a system 
whole
There are many independent decision 
makers (organisations and individuals) 
inside and outside of government involved 
in the delivery of public services.
Ongoing forum(s) for sensemaking which value and 
involve all the actors (inside and outside of government) 
who might have some of the information or resources 
needed to build better public services, using e.g. Web 2.0 
technologies.
Nested and interacting, 
interdependent 
systems
Individuals and organisations involved 
in the delivery of public services and 
interlinked and a complex matrix of 
interdependent systems.
Sectoral focus on outcomes led by chief executives and 
processes at chief executive level to identify undermining 
as well as reinforcing changes, encouraging aligned 
changes and disrupting unwanted changes.
Feedback is constantly 
occurring between 
interacting systems
Individuals and organisations involved in 
the delivery of public services influence 
and are influenced by the actions taken 
by others in a series of ongoing reflexive 
processes.
Limit the initiation of changes to that necessary to achieve 
the outcomes sought. Ministers and Chief Executives lead 
change to achieve outcomes. State Services Commissioner 
limits changes to removal of blockages or the construction 
of pan-system enablers identified by the former.
As a result of 
feedback, there will 
be adaptation and 
coevolution between 
the interacting systems
The ongoing reflexive patterns of influence 
and counter-influence between individuals 
and organisation involved in the delivery of 
public services leads to adaptive changes 
and co-evolution between the individuals, 
the organisation and the policies they are 
implementing.
Establish means to detect variance from the expected and 
take deliberate steps to understand different perspectives 
on why this is occurring. Non-compliance might be a case 
of conflicting priorities, misinterpreted signals, accidental 
happen stance or any number of other causes.
Self-organisation and 
emergence will occur 
within the systems
Individuals and organisations involved 
in the delivery of public services will 
self-organise according to their own 
sensemaking about what is happening 
and what they think might happen next. 
The results of this self-organisation will 
be the emergence of new associations 
and coalitions between individuals and 
organisations and previously unknown 
behaviour patterns. 
Treat all implementation actions as experiments and 
establish a deliberate two-loop learning process which 
allows planned actions to be modified, and also informs 
future thinking and planning.
The systems have 
socially constructed 
boundaries and are 
open to members and 
information.
The boundaries between government 
organisations and individuals and 
organisations outside government are 
socially constructed through the processes 
of interaction between them and can be 
reframed.
Focus on the boundaries that have been constructed and 
how easy or hard it is for perspectives to transcend these 
boundaries. Look for ways to reframe the boundaries so 
as to maximise the different perspectives and information 
available for problem solving.
Stability is not 
equilibrium: the 
systems are far from 
equilibrium and will 
undergo sudden and 
unpredictable changes 
disproportionate to the 
size of the stimulus
Influence patterns between individuals 
and organisations involved in the delivery 
of public services create familiar patterns 
and an image of stability which can be 
mistaken for equilibrium, when in fact the 
system occupies a far-from-equilibrium 
state which might suddenly undergo 
unpredictable change out of all proportion 
to the change stimulus.
Develop sensitivity to small changes at all levels of the 
system and adopt leadership and management processes 
that make it safe to identify patterns which do not fit.
New patterns can be encouraged where helpful to overall 
direction of change and disrupted where not.
The system’s history 
and starting point has 
a continuing effect on 
the dynamics of the 
system
The history of previous changes such as 
the 1988-89 public sector reforms and the 
2000-3 Review of the Centre will continue 
to influence behaviour of individuals and 
organisation long after the change stimulus.
Implementation leaders need to recognise that the effects 
of previous public sector reform processes continue to 
influence behaviour of individuals and organisations. 
Therefore implementation leaders need to be explicit 
about the areas where they are reinforcing previously 
implemented changes and also explicit about where a 
different trajectory and outcome is intended and make 
sure this is widely understood.
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Any knowledge of or wish for ‘better 
public services’ that individuals have will 
be filtered through an individual’s or an 
organisation’s prior experiences and will 
vary accordingly. A most important, and 
currently missing, part of Better Public 
Services implementation is initiation of an 
ongoing, purposeful conversation between 
a wide range of public service ‘users’ and 
providers about the outcomes sought 
and the actions that are individually and 
collectively needed to achieve them. This 
would not be a talkfest; it is a necessary 
and ongoing sense-making process which 
tests assumptions and creates processes 
of ongoing learning, as both a precursor 
to, and a stimulator of, service innovation 
(Weick, 1995; Ryan et al., 2008; Sorensen 
and Torfing, 2011). The implications of 
each of the characteristics of complexity 
discussed in this section and steps towards 
their mitigation are summarised in 
columns two and three of Table 1.
Implementation needs to be tight 
on outcomes but loose on means or 
pathways (e.g. Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), 
and should treat implementation as an 
ongoing experiment from which there will 
be continuous learning to inform future 
actions (Sanderson, 2009). Better Public 
Services is a complex implementation 
which seeks to achieve goals which are 
broadly stated and understood, but 
also where the implementer has neither 
sufficient information nor understanding 
about the problems standing in the way of 
achievement of the goals and the means by 
which these might be overcome. That is, at 
the very least there are many unknowns, 
and many different understandings and 
interpretations of what is ‘known’. Currently 
the implementation road map shows 
legislation amendment as a necessary task 
to be undertaken in 2012. However, if this 
is seen as a solution to be pursued on a 
fixed timeline, without any consideration 
of what is learnt as preparations proceed, 
then the actual legislative change might well 
be achieved without any of the behavioural 
changes intended. That is, many actors 
capable of taking independent actions 
based on their own information and 
understanding will adapt their behaviour, 
not out of any conscious desire to undermine 
intentions, but because their perceptions 
of the situation differ from those of the 
people leading the implementation. Thus, 
messy, risky and uncontrollable as it may 
seem, implementation needs to involve an 
experimental and tentative mindset that 
is tight on outcomes but loose on means 
and open to ‘fast-fail’ when this is needed. 
For example, a process of engagement and 
dialogue between those in a position to 
influence a student’s NCEA achievement 
– service users (young people, parents and 
employers) and providers at sector level 
– should aim to achieve ownership of the 
goal, identify and initiate collective and 
individual actions necessary to achieve it, 
learn from what is working and what is 
not, and monitor and be accountable for 
progress.
Weick and Sutcliffe’s work on highly 
reliable organisations suggests ways 
of managing the kind of uncertainty 
inherent in complex implementation. 
They suggest that unpredictability and 
uncertainty are best anticipated by ‘having 
a sense of susceptibility to the unexpected’ 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, p.87). Thus 
informed, implementation monitoring 
would focus less on the achievement of 
preordained milestones and artefacts, 
such as legislation, and more on subtle 
signs of patterns which do not fit the 
desired direction of change. According 
to Weick and Sutcliffe, all actors need an 
orientation and attitude which they call 
mindfulness of small variances from the 
expected. Mindfulness, they say, is the 
deliberate cultivation of a rich awareness 
of discriminatory detail. Deliberate policy 
changes such as the implementation 
of Better Public Services are based on 
assumptions about how the world is 
currently behaving, and will behave in 
response to planned changes. Weick and 
Sutcliffe suggest that these assumptions 
must be treated as tentative, and that the 
dominant orientation should be towards 
falsification. As a result, all actors would 
be chronically concerned about what 
does not fit, try to create a climate where 
it is safe to question assumptions and 
report problems candidly, and help all 
actors expand the number of undesirable 
consequences they envision so that they 
expand the number of precautions taken, 
contributing to a climate where people 
are wary of success and suspicious of 
quiet periods and stability. Weick and 
Sutcliffe also suggest that such situational 
awareness comes from sensitivity to 
micro-changes in information, gathered 
from day-to-day operations, which allows 
actors to make continuous adjustments 
that prevent errors from accumulating 
and enlarging. They talk about deference 
downwards and respect for expertise, not 
experts. Thus, expertise in many instances 
of public service delivery is located at the 
front line and outside the public sector 
organisation. In the case of the NCEA 
result, this might include the students 
and their parents.
Traditional implementation moni-
toring focuses on the collection of 
information which confirms an assumed 
pattern of responses, however superficial 
and non-embedded these responses 
might be, and notwithstanding evidence 
that the contrary might also be occurring. 
When working with complex systems 
and many interdependent actors, public 
managers require consciousness that 
things will not proceed in a predictable 
and orderly fashion and be able to 
recognise the problems this creates for 
monitoring and accountability. Therefore, 
the implementation road map should 
not be followed rigidly. It needs to be 
subject to ongoing revision, based on 
continuously updated knowledge from a 
wide range of perspectives, and to allow 
Traditional 
implementation 
monitoring focuses 
on the collection of 
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for learning and ‘fast-fail’. Monitoring also 
needs to allow that signs of desired and 
undesirable change might be difficult to 
detect in the early stages, which indicates 
a need for attention to weak signals and 
the qualitative features of the processes 
under way.
A sense-making approach is needed 
to uncover the multiple perceptions of 
cause and effect that are influencing 
behaviour of both users of government 
services and providers (Snowden, 2005; 
Weick, 1995; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Leadership also needs to take a form 
that is consistent with complexity (e.g. 
Snowden and Boone, 2007), which 
means that leaders will be constantly 
probing for different perspectives and 
adapting their plans as needed while not 
losing sight of the end goals established 
by government. Implementation leaders 
need to recognise that changes will 
occur without any deliberate action from 
them. The ongoing reflexive patterns of 
influence and counter-influence between 
individuals and organisations involved in 
the delivery of public services will bring 
about adaptive changes and co-evolution 
between the individuals, the organisation 
and the policies they are implementing. 
Furthermore, these individuals and 
organisations will self-organise in 
accordance with their own sense making 
about what is happening and what they 
think might happen next. As a result of 
this self-organisation, new associations 
and coalitions between individuals and 
organisations and previously unknown 
behaviour patterns will emerge without 
any deliberate intent for them to do 
so. The implementation leader cannot 
possibly understand the entire workings 
of the system they are trying to change, 
but can lead by asking the right questions, 
involving the full range of actors with 
part of the solution, and enabling action.
Leadership and management of 
complex implementation also needs to 
think differently about risk and see it as 
something to be managed proactively, 
as both a source of potential desirable 
innovation and a possible derailer. Self-
organisation and emergence should be 
expected and can lead to changes which, 
while perhaps not planned, are the 
source of step-change innovations in the 
system and can be allowed to grow. Other 
emergent phenomena will be unhelpful 
for the desired trajectory and need to be 
disrupted. Allowance needs to be made 
for this in the way implementation is 
monitored, so that the variance from 
what is expected receives more attention, 
with learning and a preparedness for 
failures playing a part. Implementation 
planning that is closed to the concepts 
of emergence and learning as you go is 
likely to ignore both types of emergent 
phenomena, and might only recognise 
unhelpful emergent phenomena when 
they have become too widespread and 
self-reinforcing to be quashed easily. 
At times progress might look messy, all 
process and no outcomes. Consistent with 
a pragmatic approach, Klijn et al. (2010) 
have suggested that we need to consider 
both process and content outcomes 
and identify a variety of dimensions for 
attention, not only those in the minds of 
the designers and implementers at the 
outset of the implementation process. 
Monitoring needs to allow for the fact 
that the effects of previous policy changes 
will still be influencing public service 
behaviour, and identify where these 
might be creating dynamics which will 
undermine the desired change if their 
influence is ignored. 
The Better Public Services Advisory 
Group has made recommendations 
about changes to make the system more 
responsive and innovative based on 
its understanding of how the system 
currently works. However, as changes 
begin to be made, the system will adapt 
in ways that are currently unknowable 
and could maintain the status quo or 
take the system in some unintended 
direction. There is a tendency for the 
public sector and individuals who work 
in it to be risk averse. If the benefits of 
emergence, as the source of innovation, 
are to be captured, then there is a need 
for ongoing monitoring of risk based on 
diverse perspectives, for the purposes of 
risk management and learning not risk 
avoidance (Eppel, 2012a; and see also 
Forbes and Cumming, this issue).
conclusion
The critical question is whether New 
Zealand’s public management system 
will be driven by a focus on achieving 
higher-value results (starting with the 
ten the government has identified) 
in collaboration with citizens, or 
whether, in reality, it will be driven by 
limited perceptions will be from within 
government agencies about what might 
need to change to achieve the results, with 
little or no reference to those beyond the 
people who use public services. This is not 
a chicken-and-egg matter; it is more than 
perspective. Leading change through the 
pursuit of outcomes, which also includes 
processes of learning and co-construction 
of higher-value (better) public services 
with the users of those services, will ensure 
that the priority and order of changes will 
serve the achievement of those outcomes. 
Leading change through a multi-stranded 
programme of instrumental changes, 
however much they might be needed, is a 
recipe for competition between competing 
objectives and a lack of clarity about 
how this competition is best managed. 
Unintended outcomes and surprise 
results should be expected. Whether these 
unintended effects are used to reinforce 
the trajectory of change and speed up the 
achievement of results, or end up undoing 
change which is heading in the right 
direction and creating confusion among 
individual and organisational actors, 
depends on whether the implementation 
leaders take adequate cognisance of 
complexity and adopt a pragmatic 
stance towards achieving the goals of the 
reform.
For public servants involved in the 
delivery of services, and especially for 
those involved in leadership of the 
implementation of Better Public Services, 
the achievement of the direction of 
change signalled by the prime minister’s 
results focus requires an unequivocal 
focus on the outcome sought (better 
public service results for New Zealanders 
from the perspective of government, 
taxpayers and end-users); learning and 
co-designing with service users; flexibility 
about the means; and a risk-management 
rather that a risk-aversion approach 
and continuous learning from diverse 
perspectives as it goes along. 
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